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Abstract
This paper introduces non-diversiﬁable risk in the Stiglitz-Weiss adverse selection model, so that
an increase in the average riskiness of the borrower pool causes higher portfolio risk. This opens
up the possibility of equilibrium credit rationing. Comparative statics analysis shows that an
increase in risk aversion turns a two-price equilibrium into a rationing equilibrium. A two-price
equilibrium is more ineﬃcient than a rationing equilibrium, and a usury law that rules out the
higher of the two interest rates can be welfare-improving. Contrary to the common result, the
equilibrium may be characterized by over-investment.
JEL classiﬁcation: D82, E51, G21
Key words: asymmetric information, credit rationing.
1 Introduction
Models of adverse selection or moral hazard in the credit market show why lenders tend to ﬁnance
investment projects which are too risky from their point of view. The reason why lenders dislike risky
projects is that, when standard credit contracts are used, they generate lower expected repayment.
Due to the common assumption of independence of the payoﬀs on diﬀerent projects and the law
of large numbers for large economies (Uhlig, 1996), the repayments on a well-diversiﬁed credit
portfolio are safe, however (an implication that tends to irritate scholars with a background in
portfolio theory): uncorrelated single-name credit risks cancel out and do not create any portfolio
risk for the lender. A notable case in point is the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) (henceforth: “SW”)
adverse selection model, in which an increase in the interest rate raises the average riskiness of the
pool of active borrowers, but nonetheless the return on lending remains safe.
The present paper introduces non-diversiﬁable risk to the SW model (with two borrower types), so
that an increase in the average riskiness of the borrower pool causes higher portfolio risk, which has
to be borne by lenders. This has several interesting implications for equilibrium and welfare. First,
it opens up the possibility of equilibrium credit rationing. As shown independently by Coco (1997)
and Arnold and Riley (2009), non-monotonicity of the expected repayment lenders receive as a
function of the interest rates potentially gives rise to a two-price equilibrium with market clearing
at the higher rate in the SW model. There cannot be pure rationing at a single interest rate in
the SW model, because it would be proﬁtable to serve rationed risky borrowers at their maximum
acceptable interest rate.1 This strategy of “picking risky borrowers” might be unattractive to risk-
averse lenders when the project payoﬀs are correlated, since it gives rise to a highly risky credit
portfolio. Thus, a proﬁtable deviation from the strategies that lead to rationing may not exist,
restoring the possibility of equilibrium credit rationing.
A two-price equilibrium entails higher average project risks and, hence, higher portfolio risk than a
rationing equilibrium, at a given level of investment. This is because market clearing at the higher
interest rate implies that all risky projects are ﬁnanced. As a consequence, whether a two-price
equilibrium or a rationing equilibrium arises depends systematically on lenders’ degree of relative
risk aversion. To address this issue, we use the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) version of
the Ordinal Certainty Equivalent (OCE) utility function proposed by Selden (1978), which allows
to disentangle changes in risk aversion from changes in the preference for consumption smoothing
over time. We show that starting from a two-price equilibrium, a rationing equilibrium arises when
1Bester (1985, 1987), Riley (1987), Lensink and Sterken (2002), and De Meza and Webb (2006) provide alternative
arguments against the relevance of equilibrium credit rationing.
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(everything else equal) the degree of relative risk aversion grows suﬃciently large. Thus, stronger
risk aversion tends to make the emergence of a rationing equilibrium more likely.
A two-price equilibrium is, in a speciﬁc sense, more ineﬃcient than a rationing equilibrium: consider
a parameter change that leads to a switch from a two-price equilibrium to a rationing equilibrium.
The level of investment is continuous in model parameters, so it changes only slightly. However,
the riskiness of the pool of active borrowers deteriorates discontinuously, since all risky ﬁrms get
ﬁnance in a two-price equilibrium. As a consequence, borrowers have to pay higher risk premia, so
aggregate proﬁt and total welfare jump downward. One way to avoid this ineﬃciency of a two-price
equilibrium is to impose a usury law that prohibits interest rates above the equilibrium rate with
pure rationing. Analogous results are derived by Coco (1997, Section 3) in a model with independent
returns in which projects diﬀer by both riskiness and mean return.2
Following De Meza and Webb (1987), next we address the question of whether there is too little or
too much investment in equilibrium, relative to a ﬁrst-best or a second-best optimum. Contrary to
the common result that equilibrium is generally characterized by under-investment, we ﬁnd that
equilibrium over-investment may arise in a two-price equilibrium or in a rationing equilibrium, viz.,
when ﬁrms are endowed with a large amount of collateral and little weight is put on their expected
utility in the optimum solution. Under these conditions, optimum saving is low, and may thus fall
short of equilibrium investment, because households’ consumption can be satisﬁed by reallocating
the ﬁrms’ collateral to them.3
The motivation for the analysis is the observation that returns on risky investment projects are
correlated, so that someone has to bear the additional risk when ﬁrms carry out riskier investment
projects. While direct evidence of correlation between individual ﬁrms’ returns on investment is
hard to come by, there are numerous country studies showing that economy-wide and industry
factors explain much of the variance in ﬁrm earnings (e.g., Brealey, 1971, for the U.S.), that ﬁrm-
level proﬁtability is strongly aﬀected by aggregate demand shocks (e.g., Machin and van Reenen,
1993, for the U.K.), and that macroeconomic shocks have a profound impact on business failures
(e.g., Gaﬀeo and Santoro, 2009, for Italy). Generally, the fact that aggregate corporate proﬁts
are strongly procyclical means that individual ﬁrms’ proﬁts are positively correlated at business
cycle frequency. These observations suggest that there is signiﬁcant correlation between the returns
2See also De Meza and Webb (2006).
3This relates to variants of the SW model concerned with optimal risk sharing, such as Bester (1985, 1987) (see
also the survey in Coco, 2000). These models usually assume risk-averse borrowers and independent project risks (i.e.,
no risk for lenders) and highlight the welfare loss due to the use of collateral as a sorting device: since a borrower’s
marginal utility is higher when his project fails, he should not put up any collateral in a ﬁrst-best optimum.
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on individual ﬁrms’ risky endeavors. One might object that, even so, independence would be a
convenient assumption if it reduced complexity without having a major impact on the results.
However, the summary of the results above shows that the introduction of non-diversiﬁable risk
leads to much richer model implications, as diﬀerent types of non-market clearing equilibria emerge
depending on consumers’ risk attitudes, with interesting welfare implications.
Section 2 presents the model with CRRA preferences. In Section 3, we demonstrate that pure
credit rationing can arise. Section 4 introduces OCE preferences and analyzes the impact of the
degree of risk aversion on the type of equilibrium. Section 5 highlights the ineﬃciency of a two-price
equilibrium. Section 6 addresses the question of equilibrium under-investment. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
There are two time periods t = 1, 2. There is one homogeneous (perishable) good, which can be
used for consumption or investment. There is a continuum of measure M (> 0) of identical risk-
averse consumers, each endowed with y (> 0) units of the homogeneous good in the ﬁrst period
and nothing in the second period. So to consume in period 2, they have to save in period 1. The
consumers’ preferences are represented by the CRRA utility function
E[u(c1, c2)] =
c1−θ1
1− θ + δE
(
c1−θ2
1− θ
)
, 0 < δ, θ < 1, (1)
where ct is period-t consumption of the homogenous good (t = 1, 2). θ measures the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and the degree of relative risk aversion.
The assumption that 1/θ is greater than one ensures that capital supply is upward-sloping, so that
the analysis is comparable to the existing literature. In the model with OCE preferences, we will
maintain the assumption that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds unity but allow
for arbitrary positive degrees of relative risk aversion.
There are a continuum of measure NS (> 0) of safe ﬁrms and a continuum of measure NR (> 0)
of risky ﬁrms, each endowed with collateral C (> 0) and the ability to turn B (> C) units of
the homogeneous good invested in the ﬁrst period into a random second-period output of the
homogeneous good. Safe ﬁrms’ projects succeed with with probability pS and risky ﬁrms’ projects
with probability pR (0 < pR < pS < 1). In case of success, they yield RS or RR, respectively. If
a project fails, the payoﬀ is zero. The projects are equally proﬁtable on average: pSRS = pRRR
(≡ R¯ > B). Standard debt is the only ﬁnancial instrument.4 Firms’ collateral C cannot be traded
4Standard debt is the optimal mode of ﬁnance in related models, e.g., when lenders can observe whether a project
has succeeded or not but not its payoﬀ in case of success (see Besanko and Thakor, 1987).
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in the capital market.5 Firm owners are risk-neutral and apply for capital if the expected return
on their investment (taking care of the possibility that they lose their collateral) is non-negative.
There is asymmetric information: lenders are unable to observe whether a ﬁrm owns a safe or a
risky project.
The novel assumption is that the projects’ payoﬀs are not independent. There are three states of
nature s ∈ {R,S, F}. In state R, which occurs with probability pR, all projects succeed; in state
S, which occurs with probability pS − pR, only the safe projects succeed; in state F (i.e., with
probability 1 − pS), all projects fail. Thus, the returns of any two risky projects as well as of any
two safe projects are perfectly correlated: if one risky project succeeds, all risky projects succeed; if
one safe project succeeds, all safe projects succeed; and the risky projects never succeed unless the
safe projects do.6 As a consequence of non-diversiﬁable risk, and contrary to the SW model, the
single-name risks do not cancel out, so lenders face positive portfolio risk. For instance, in state F ,
all borrowers are unable to repay, so lenders merely receive the posted collateral.
We assume that the revenue from lending is passed through completely to the suppliers of capital.
One interpretation is that loans are made and deposits are taken by intermediaries without oper-
ating costs and without equity. Alternatively, one may think of collateralized corporate bonds held
by funds (so that the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms are represented proportionally in each household’s
portfolio). A more complete model would introduce banks with positive equity, which serves as a
buﬀer against losses on loans, so that deposits are safe and bank owners carry the non-diversiﬁable
risk that does not remain in the ﬁrm sector. The main point, which the present model captures in
the simplest possible fashion, is that the realization of investment projects creates non-diversiﬁable
risks that someone has to bear and that these risks have a profound impact on the nature and
eﬃciency of equilibrium in the credit market.7
5We maintain this assumption, even though it is not innocuous in the welfare analysis (cf. footnote 14), for the
sake of comparability with the literature.
6We checked the robustness of our results by making diﬀerent assumptions about the dependence of project
returns. For instance, we analyzed the model under the alternative assumptions that there is positive but imperfect
correlation and that the returns on safe projects are mutually independent. The sets of parameters for which, e.g.,
rationing or over-investment occur changes, but the essence of our results remains unaﬀected.
7It will be seen that for well-collateralized credit, ﬁrm owners bear signiﬁcantly more risk than suppliers of credit
(see footnotes 8 and 11).
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3 Restoring credit rationing
This section demonstrates that, unlike in the SW model (cf. Coco, 1997, and Arnold and Riley,
2009), credit rationing may occur in the presence of portfolio risk.
Let r denote the interest rate (because of asymmetric information, lenders cannot set type-speciﬁc
interest rates), λ ≡ NS/(NS +NR) the proportion of safe borrowers, and p ≡ λpS + (1− λ)pR the
average success probability among all ﬁrms. Firms of risk type i ∈ {S,R} apply for capital if the
expected proﬁt πi(r) = pi[Ri − (1 + r)B] + (1− pi)(−C) is non-negative, i.e., if r ≤ ri, where
ri ≡ 1
B
(
R¯− C
pi
+ C
)
− 1, i ∈ {S,R}
(ri > 0 for i ∈ {S,R}).8 The demand for capital is
D(r) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(NS +NR)B; r ≤ rS
NRB; rS < r ≤ rR
0; rR < r
. (2)
The average success probability in the pool of credit applicants is p for r ≤ rS and pR for rS <
r ≤ rR. Denote the (random) return on lending at rate r in state s as i(r). This function will
be determined below. Since the revenue from lending is passed through completely, the consumers
solve
max
s
:
(y − s)1−θ
1− θ + δE
(
{[1 + i(r)]s}1−θ
1− θ
)
by choosing an appropriate level of savings s. Let
Rˆ(r) ≡ E
{
[1 + i(r)]1−θ
}
. (3)
Optimal saving is
s =
y
1 + δ−
1
θ Rˆ(r)−
1
θ
≡ s∗(r) (4)
8The variances of safe ﬁrms’ proﬁt and their repayment to lenders are pS(1 − pS)[RS − (1 + r)B + C]2 and
pS(1 − pS)[(1 + r)B − C], respectively. At r = rS, the ratio of the variances is [C/(R¯ − C)]2 and exceeds unity if
C > R¯/2, i.e., if collateral does not fall short of half of the expected project payoﬀ. Similarly, the ratio of the variance
of risky ﬁrms’ proﬁt to repayment at r = rS (
pS−pR
pR
R¯+ C
R¯ − C
)2
exceeds unity under the weaker condition C > [1−pS/(2pR)]R¯. This conﬁrms the assertion that for well-collateralized
credit, ﬁrm owners bear the bulk of the risk created by their investments at an equilibrium with interest rate rS, even
though the return on lending is not safe either. If expected proﬁt is a modest percentage of expected project payoﬀ
and, hence, of expected repayment, a comparison in terms of coeﬃcients of variation reinforces this conclusion.
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(0 < s∗(r) < y), and the indirect utility function is
u(y − s∗(r)) + δE {u([1 + i(r)]s∗(r))} = y
1−θ
1− θ
[
1 + δ
1
θ Rˆ(r)
1
θ
]θ ≡ v(r). (5)
From (4), the total supply of capital by a measure M of consumers facing the stochastic return
proﬁle i(r) (yet to be determined) is
S(r,M) = s∗(r)M. (6)
For the sake of brevity, we focus attention on model speciﬁcations such that
NRB < S(rS ,M) < (NS +NR)B. (7)
That is, the supply of capital at interest rate rS is suﬃcient to carry out the risky projects but
not all projects. This assumption rules out single-price market clearing equilibria (with or without
adverse selection) and thus allows us to focus on the two most interesting types of equilibria: pure
credit rationing equilibrium and two-price equilibrium. A pure rationing equilibrium prevails when
there is positive excess demand for capital but there is no interest rate that implies a more favorable
return distribution for the consumers. Let X denote the quantity of capital channeled from lenders
to borrowers.
Definition 1: (r1,X) is a pure rationing equilibrium (PRE) if
↪→ X = S(r1,M) < D(r1),
↪→ there is no r such that v(r) > v(r1).
A two-price equilibrium entails that credit is given at two diﬀerent interest rates r1 and r2 (> r1),
with positive excess demand at the lower rate r1 and equality of supply and residual demand at
the higher rate r2. To qualify as an equilibrium, the two interest rates have to provide consumers
with the same level of indirect utility. Moreover, interest rates at which there is positive residual
demand (i.e., r < r2) must be no more favorable to consumers than r1 and r2. Let M1 (> 0)
and M2 = M − M1 (> 0) denote the measures of consumers giving credit and X1 and X2 the
quantities of capital channelled from lenders to borrowers at r1 and r2, respectively. Denote the
residual demand at r2 as D˜2.
Definition 2: (r1, r2,M1,M2,X1,X2) with r2 > r1 is a two-price equilibrium (TPE) if
↪→ v(r1) = v(r2),
↪→ X1 = S(r1,M1) < D(r1),
↪→ X2 = S(r2,M2) = D˜2,
↪→ there is no r < r2 such that v(r) > v(r2).
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In the original SW model, pure credit rationing cannot arise in equilibrium; if there is excess demand
at rS but not at rR, as stipulated in (7), the equilibrium is a TPE (see Coco, 1997, Arnold and
Riley, 2009, and Appendix A.1). Our ﬁrst main result states that, given the presence of aggregate
risk and risk-averse suppliers of capital, a PRE can arise: a PRE exists whenever there is not a
TPE (except in the measure-zero event v(rR) = v(rS)):
Proposition 1: Let (7) hold. (a) If v(rR) < v(rS), there is a PRE and not a TPE. (b) If v(rR) >
v(rS), there is a TPE and not a PRE. (c) If v(rR) = v(rS), there are a TPE and a PRE.
Proof: The crucial observation is that S(r,M) (for given M) and v(r) move in the same direction
as r changes. This follows immediately from (4)-(6): r aﬀects S(r,M) and v(r) only via Rˆ(r), and
both functions increase when Rˆ(r) rises. From (3),
Rˆ′(r) = (1− θ)E
{
[1 + i(r)]−θi′(r)
}
(8)
whenever i′(r) exists. Let is(r) denote the return on lending in state s:9
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
iR(r)
iS(r)
iF (r)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
r
λr + (1− λ)
(
C
B − 1
)
C
B − 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ , r ≤ rS, (9)
and ⎛
⎝ iR(r)
iS/F (r)
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ r
C
B − 1
⎞
⎠ , rS < r ≤ rR (10)
(see Figure 1). Both for r < rS and for rS < r < rR, we have i
′
s(r) ≥ 0 in all states and strict inequal-
ity for some state s. It follows from (8) that Rˆ′(r) > 0 and, therefore, (s∗)′(r) > 0, ∂S(r,M)/∂r > 0,
and v′(r) > 0 for r < rS and for rS < r < rR. For r > rS, let Δ(r) denote the diﬀerence between
9A subscript s/s′ on a function or variable indicates that it applies in states s and s′.
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Rˆ(r) and Rˆ(rS):
Δ(r) ≡ Rˆ(r)− Rˆ(rS), r > rS. (11)
Using (3), (9), and (10), one obtains
Δ(r) = −(pS − pR)
{[
λ(1 + rS) + (1− λ)C
B
]1−θ
−
(
C
B
)1−θ}
+pR
[
(1 + r)1−θ − (1 + rS)1−θ
]
. (12)
Let ε > 0 and ε → 0. As the last term in square brackets goes to zero, while the term in braces
does not (since rS > 0 > C/B − 1), we have limε>0,ε→0Δ(rS + ε) < 0. That is, Rˆ(r) and, hence,
s∗(r), S(r,M), and v(r) jump downward at rS . Thus, both S(r,M) (for given M) and v(r) attain
their respective global maxima on the interval [0, rR] either at rS or at rR. The two constellations
consistent with (7) are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 (evidently, parameter combinations giving rise
to either case exist, as will be illustrated by means of example below).
(a) In Figure 2, S(r,M) and v(r) attain their (unique) respective maxima at rS . (rS , S(rS ,M)) is
a PRE. Since v(rS) > v(r1) and rS < r2 whenever v(r1) = v(r2) for two interest rates r1 and r2, a
TPE does not exist.
(b) In Figure 3, S(r,M) and v(r) attain their (unique) maxima at rR. In this case, a PRE does
not exist. For whenever there is positive excess demand at r (< rR), the second condition in the
deﬁnition of a PRE is violated: v(rR) > v(r). Let r1 = rS. There exists an interest rate r2 > r1
such that v(r2) = v(r1). Let X1 and X2 be determined by
X1 =
NS +NR
NS
[S(r1,M)−NRB] = S(r1,M)−X2 (13)
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and M1 = X1/s
∗(r1) (> 0) and M2 = X2/s∗(r2) (> 0). From (5), v(r2) = v(r1) implies Rˆ(r2) =
Rˆ(r1). From (4), it follows that s
∗(r2) = s∗(r1). Using (6) and (13), it follows from the deﬁnitions
of M1 and M2 that M1 +M2 = M . The residual demand at r2 is
D˜2 =
[
1− X1
(NS +NR)B
]
NRB. (14)
It is straightforward to check that (r1, r2,M1,M2,X1,X2), thus deﬁned, is a TPE: by construction,
v(r1) = v(r2); from (6) and M1 = X1/s
∗(r1), X1 = S(r1,M1); from M1 < M , ∂S(r,M)/∂M > 0,
r1 = rS , and (7), S(r1,M1) < D(r1); from (6) and M2 = X2/s
∗(r2), X2 = S(r2,M2); from (13)
and (14) together with (6) and M2 = X2/s
∗(r2), S(r2,M2) = D˜2 (= −(NR/NS)S(r1,M) + (NS +
NR)(NR/NS)B); by construction, v(r) ≤ v(r2) for all r < r2.
(c) The proofs that (rS , S(rS ,M)) is a PRE in case (a) and (r1, r2,M1,M2,X1,X2) is a TPE in
case (b) also go through when v(rS) = v(rR). ||
The multiplicity of equilibria in case (c) is not by itself remarkable, as v(rS) = v(rR) is a measure-
zero event.10 We will come back to this case, however, when we compare welfare levels in the two
types of equilibria. For now, the important point is that aggregate risk makes the emergence of a
PRE possible.11
As a numerical example, let the model parameters be given by:
10One could avoid this multiplicity by making the inequality in the second condition of Deﬁnition 1 weak.
11Since rS is the single equilibrium interest rate in a PRE, the considerations of who bears how much risk in
footnote 8 apply. In a TPE, the same considerations apply for safe ﬁrms and for risky ﬁrms which get credit at rS.
For risky ﬁrms that receive credit at r2, the ratio of the variances of proﬁt and repayment is ([(1− λ)(pS − pR)C −
pSR¯]/{[pR + λ(pS − pR)]C})2 and exceeds unity if C > {pS/[(1− 2λ)(pS − pR)− pR]}R¯.
9
y M θ δ B pS pR R¯ C NS NR
10 3,000 0.5 0.95 100 0.9 0.8 110 80 100 100
Safe and risky ﬁrms apply for credit up to interest rates rS = 13.33% and rR = 17.5%, respectively.
At rS , each consumer supplies s(rS) = 4.9369 units of capital, so the total supply of capital is
14,810.6541 (= S(rS ,M)). Since it is higher than 10,000 (= NRB) and lower than 20,000 (=
(NS + NR)B), condition (7) is satisﬁed. As Δ(rR) = 0.0066 > 0, the equilibrium is a TPE. The
consumers’ indirect utility is v(rS) = 8.8883. A measure 96.2131 of randomly selected ﬁrms receive
a loan at 13.33% interest, and the 51.8935 risky ﬁrms rationed at this interest receive a loan at
15.71% interest.
4 Risk aversion and rationing
In a PRE, since rationing is necessarily random, the proportion of realized projects which are risky
is equal to the proportion of risky ﬁrms in the total population of ﬁrms (i.e., 1− λ). The presence
of rationing means that some risky ﬁrms do not get funds. In a TPE, by contrast, all risky projects
are carried out, which makes the return proﬁle less attractive from the risk-averse lenders’ point
of view. This suggests that a PRE is more likely to emerge as the lenders’ degree of relative risk
aversion rises. The present section gives a precise statement of this proposition.
Within the framework used so far we encounter the familiar problem that both relative risk aver-
sion and the preference for intertemporal consumption smoothing are parameterized by the same
parameter θ. So in order to appropriately address the question of which type of equilibrium emerges
under what degree of risk aversion, we generalize the analysis by following Selden’s (1978) OCE
approach. Let cˆ2 be the certainty equivalent (CE) corresponding to the period utility function
introduced in (1):
cˆ1−θ2
1− θ = E
(
c1−θ2
1− θ
)
, θ > 0, θ = 1 (15)
(we now allow for θ > 1).12 Households’ utility is given by
u(c1, cˆ2) =
c1−η1
1− η + δ
cˆ1−η2
1− η , 0 < η < 1. (16)
1/η is the (intertemporal) elasticity of substitution between c1 and cˆ2. The model analyzed above
is the special case with η = θ.
12For the sake of brevity, we omit the case of logarithmic utility (i.e., θ = 1), which has to be treated separately.
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Figure 4: Switch from TPE to PRE
Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ) deﬁned in (3) is the CE of 1 + i(r). Using this deﬁnition and c2 = [1 + i(r)]s, the CE
deﬁned in (15) can be expressed as:
cˆ2 = sRˆ(r)
1
1−θ .
Households solve
max
s
:
(y − s)1−η
1− η + δ
[
sRˆ(r)
1
1−θ
]1−η
1− η .
The solution is
s =
y
1 + δ
− 1
η Rˆ(r)
− 1
1−θ
1−η
η
≡ s∗(r), (17)
and indirect utility is
v(r) ≡ y
1−η
1− η
[
1 + δ
1
η Rˆ(r)
1
1−θ
1−η
η
]η
. (18)
Given the novel deﬁnitions of s∗(r) and v(r), deﬁne capital supply (cf. (6)) and the two types of
equilibria as before. Our ﬁrst task is to generalize Proposition 1:
Proposition 2: The assertion of Proposition 1 also holds true in the OCE framework.
Proof: The crucial observation is that, as before, changes in the interest rate move S(r,M) and
v(r) in the same direction, as is evident from (17) and (18). From (3),
d
[
Rˆ(r)
1
1−θ
]
dr
= Rˆ(r)
θ
1−θE
{
[1 + i(r)]−θi′(r)
}
.
Equations (9) and (10) hold true without modiﬁcation. So for all r < rS and rS < r < rR, we
have d[Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ)]/dr > 0 and a fortiori (s∗)′(r) > 0 (from (17)), ∂S(r,M)/∂r > 0 (from (6)), and
v′(r) > 0 (from (18)). Since (3), (9), and (10) are unchanged, Δ(r) deﬁned in (11) satisﬁes (12).
For θ < 1, the arguments put forward in the proof of Proposition 1 prove Rˆ(rS + ε) < Rˆ(rS) for
ε positive and small. Hence, Rˆ(rS + ε)
1/(1−θ) < Rˆ(rS)1/(1−θ). From (6), (17), and (18), it follows
that S(r,M) and v(r) jump downward as r rises above rS. For θ > 1, the term in braces in (12) is
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negative, so limε>0,ε→0Δ(rS + ε) > 0, i.e., Rˆ(rS + ε) > Rˆ(rS) for ε positive and small. As before,
this implies Rˆ(rS + ε)
1/(1−θ) < Rˆ(rS)1/(1−θ), so that, in this case also, S(r,M) and v(r) display
downward discontinuities at rS . This proves that both S(r,M) and v(r) attain their respective
maxima either at rS or at rR. Under the maintained assumption (7), the remainder of the proof
runs parallel to the proof of Proposition 1. ||
We are now in a position to give a precise statement of the proposition that higher risk aversion
makes the emergence of a PRE more likely:
Proposition 3: Starting from a TPE, as the degree of relative risk aversion θ rises and (7) remains
satisﬁed, a PRE emerges.
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. (a) Increases in θ reduce s∗(r). (b) For θ large enough, s∗(r)
and v(r) attain their maxima at rS. Thus, starting from a TPE, as risk aversion becomes stronger,
the capital supply schedule shifts downward, and at some point the maximum will occur at rS and
a PRE emerges, provided that (7) is still valid (see Figure 4).
(a) From (17), as noted by Basu und Ghosh (1993, p. 121), a decrease in the CE Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ) reduces
s∗(r). So we have to prove that an increase in θ reduces Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ) or, equivalently, ln[Rˆ(r)1/(1−θ)].
From (3) (suppressing the argument of the functions Rˆ(r) and i(r)),
∂
[
ln
(
Rˆ
1
1−θ
)]
∂θ
=
1
(1− θ)2
1
E [(1 + i)1−θ]
·
(
E
[
(1 + i)1−θ
]
ln {E[ (1 + i)1−θ ]} −E
{
(1 + i)1−θ ln
[
(1 + i)1−θ
]})
.
Since (1 + i)1−θ ln[(1 + i)1−θ] is a strictly convex function of the random variable (1 + i)1−θ, the
derivative is negative by virtue of Jensen’s inequality.
(b) From (12),
Δ(rR) =
(
C
B
)1−θ ⎧⎨
⎩−(pS − pR)
⎡
⎣
(
λ
1 + rS
C
B
+ 1− λ
)1−θ
− 1
⎤
⎦
+ pR
⎡
⎣
(
1 + rR
C
B
)1−θ
−
(
1 + rS
C
B
)1−θ⎤⎦
⎫⎬
⎭ .
Since C/B < 1+rS < 1+rR, as θ grows large (in particular larger than one), the power terms inside
the braces become arbitrarily small, so Δ(rR) > 0. From (11), Rˆ(rR) > Rˆ(rS) and Rˆ(rR)
1/(1−θ) <
Rˆ(rS)
1/(1−θ). From (17), it follows that s∗(r) attains its maximum at rS . ||
The example considered below shows that there exist model speciﬁcations such that a switch from
a TPE to a PRE occurs. More generally, the following condition is suﬃcient to ensure that (7)
12
remains valid as θ rises:
NRB <
y
1 + δ
− 1
η
(
C
B
)− 1−η
η
M. (19)
i(rS) ≥ C/B − 1 in all states of nature with strict inequality in some state of nature. Hence,
Rˆ(rS)
1/(1−θ) > C/B. From (6) and (17), S(rS ,M) exceeds the term on the right-hand side of (19)
for all θ, so NRB < S(rS ,M). The validity of the second inequality in (7) follows from the fact
that it is satisﬁed in the TPE and S(rS ,M) becomes smaller as θ increases (step (a) in the proof
of Proposition 3).
In the numerical example introduced at the end of the preceding section (which implicitly assumes
θ = η = 0.5), the critical value for θ, above which the equilibrium is a PRE, is 2.5435. If, for
instance, θ = 3, we have Δ(rR) = 0.0058. The single equilibrium interest rate is rS = 13.33%,
indirect utility is v(rS) = 8.8516. The supply of capital is 14,684.1058, so 53.1589 (or 26.58%) of
the borrowers are rationed.
Another way of analyzing the impact of portfolio risk on the nature of equilibrium is to com-
pare the model with correlated payoﬀs to the (identically parameterized) model with independent
payoﬀs. Since rationing cannot arise in the model with uncorrelated risks, it follows immediately
from Propositions 1 and 2 that the introduction of correlated risks (holding everything else equal)
potentially causes rationing. Details are in Appendix A.1.
5 Ineﬃciency of a two-price equilibrium
From a welfare point of view, a TPE is particularly unattractive. For even leaving aside the question
of whether total investment is at its optimal level, it is precisely the risky projects, disliked by the
risk-averse lenders, which have a one-hundred percent chance of being ﬁnanced. In the present
section, we show that, as a consequence, a change in a model parameters that gives rise to a switch
from a TPE to a PRE has a discontinuous positive impact on welfare. Coco (1997, pp. 12-13)
arrives at the same conclusion under the assumption that riskier projects have lower expected
(uncorrelated) returns and concludes that a usury law that prevents lenders from attracting risky
borrowers at high interest rates raises welfare. This conclusion naturally carries over to our set-up
with non-diversiﬁable risk and risk-averse lenders.13
Proposition 4: A parameter change that leads to a switch from a TPE to a PRE has a continuous
eﬀect on household utility but leads to a discontinuous increase in aggregate proﬁt.
13The eﬀects of usury laws in the presence of moral hazard are analyzed in Coco and De Meza (2009).
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Figure 5: Welfare eﬀect of a switch from TPE to PRE (θ > 1)
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. We consider ﬁrst (a) the knife-edge case v(rS) = v(rR), in
which both a PRE and a TPE exist, and then (b) a small change in a parameter that leads to a
switch from a TPE to a PRE.
(a) Consider the model with OCE preferences and suppose parameters are such that v(rS) = v(rR),
i.e., Δ(rR) = 0. From part (c) of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, (rS , S(rS ,M)) is a PRE, and
there is also a TPE with r2 = rR. Households’ indirect utility is v(rS) in both equilibria. The mass
of projects carried out in equilibrium S(rS ,M)/B is also the same in both equilibria. But while
in the PRE the loan rate is rS for all borrowers who get funds, some borrowers have to pay the
interest rate rR in the TPE. This is the price ﬁrms have to pay in order to make households ﬁnance
riskier projects. Total expected ﬁrm proﬁt in the TPE is
X1
B
(1− λ)πR(rS)
(where use is made of πS(rS) = 0 and πR(r2) = πR(rR) = 0). This compares with aggregate proﬁt
S(rS ,M)
B
(1− λ)πR(rS)
in a PRE (where use is made of πS(rS) = 0). Since X1 < S(rS ,M), expected proﬁt is strictly less
in the TPE.
(b) If θ > 1, a switch from a TPE to a PRE occurs when Δ(rR) changes from negative to positive,
and vice versa for θ < 1. Consider model parameters (B,C, pS , pR, λ) = (B
′, C ′, p′S , p
′
R, λ
′) such that
Δ(rR) = 0. Consider a change in a parameter a (∈ {B,C, pS , pR, λ}) that has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on
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Δ(rR) (i.e., dΔ(rR)/da = 0 for (B,C, pS , pR, λ) = (B′, C ′, p′S , p′R, λ′)). Without loss of generality,
let dΔ(rR)/da > 0 (if the reverse inequality holds true, consider parameter −a). For instance, let
a = λ and θ > 1: from (12), dΔ(r)/dλ > 0 for θ > 1 (see Figure 5). For θ > 1, when the parameter
rises from a′ − ε to a′ + ε (ε positive and small), Δ(rR) turns from negative to positive and a PRE
replaces a TPE, and vice versa for θ < 1. From the analysis in the preceding section, it is clear that
this is the only way a change in a parameter can bring about a switch from a TPE to PRE. From
(3), (9), and (18), v(rS) is a continuous function of model parameters. From step (a), aggregate
proﬁt jumps upward. ||
As pointed out by Coco (1997), this special ineﬃciency of a TPE can be avoided by imposing an
upper bound r¯ on the set of admissible interest rates:
Proposition 5: If the equilibrium is a TPE, imposing an interest rate ceiling r¯ ∈ (rS , r2) raises
welfare.
Proof: Deﬁne a PRE with an interest ceiling as in Deﬁnition 1 except that we add the condition
r1 ≤ r¯. The condition r ≤ r¯ rules out the existence of a TPE, for v(rS) exceeds v(r) for any
admissible pair of interest rates which yield the same expected utility. (rS , S(rS ,M)) is a PRE
with interest ceiling, since v(r) < v(rS) for all r ≤ r¯, r = rS . ||
To illustrate the assertions of Propositions 4 and 5, we modify our running example such that θ is
close to the critical value above which a PRE emerges:
y M η θ δ B pS pR R¯ C NS NR
10 3,000 0.5 2.55 0.95 100 0.9 0.8 110 80 99 101
We also changed the numbers of safe and risky ﬁrms slightly, but will return to the original values
in a second. At interest rate rS = 13.33%, each household saves s
∗(rS) = 4.9029, so the supply
of capital is 14,708.7000. As demand drops from 20,000 to 10,100 at rS , condition (7) is satisﬁed.
The critical value for θ above which there is a PRE is 2.5720, so the equilibrium is a TPE with
r2 = 17.47% (which can also be inferred from Δ(rR) = −0.0002 and θ > 1). Indirect utility and
aggregate proﬁt are v(rS) = v(r2) = 8.8587 and 157.8703, respectively. Now, let NS = NR = 100,
holding all other parameters ﬁxed, so that λ rises from 49.5% to 50%. Since θ is now above the
critical value 2.5435 (Δ(rR) = 6·10−5 is positive), a PRE emerges. Indirect utility rises only slightly
(to v(rS) = 8.8591), but aggregate proﬁt soars by more than 50% to 245.1701. In the former case,
with 99 safe and 101 risky ﬁrms, consider the imposition of an interest rate ceiling r¯ between 13.34%
and 15.70%. The equilibrium becomes a PRE with 13.33% interest. Borrower expected utility is
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(v(rS) =) 8.8587, as in the TPE without the interest ceiling. But aggregate ﬁrm proﬁt rises from
157.8703 to ((X/B)(1 − λ)πR(rS) =) 247.5964.
6 Optimum investment
A TPE is “more ineﬃcient” than a PRE, but even a PRE entails ineﬃcient risk sharing. This is
because ﬁrms’ collateral is a potential hedge against households’ period-2 consumption risk, but
is not used completely in order to insure consumers in equilibrium, as ﬁrms which do not invest
or whose projects succeed keep their collateral.14 This section characterizes the optimal solution
of the model, with eﬃcient risk sharing, and addresses the question of whether the market brings
forth too little or too much investment.
For the sake of simplicity, we return to the expected utility setup. In the main text, we maintain the
assumption that information is asymmetric: when n projects are carried out, λn turn out to be safe
and (1−λ)n risky. We assume that the ﬁrms’ collateral can only be consumed in the second period.
The constrained-eﬃcient solution maximizes household expected utility for a given level β of each
ﬁrm owners’ expected utility by a suitable choice of investment and state-contingent consumption
levels. We show that under-investment occurs, as one might expect, for high levels of β and for low
values of collateral. However, since decreases in β reduce the need to invest in order to achieve the
ﬁrm owners’ given level of expected utility and increases in collateral expand the pool of resources
available for period-2 consumption, equilibrium over-investment can arise for low values of β and
large values of collateral. (The ﬁrst-best case, in which the planner can distinguish safe from risky
projects, is analyzed in Appendix A.2.)
Suppose all ﬁrm owners receive the same levels of consumption in period 2, irrespective of whether
their project is realized or not. Let αs denote the ﬁrm owners’ consumption level in state s ∈
{R,S, F}. Since ﬁrm owners are risk-neutral, we can assume without loss of generality that their
expected utility equals expected consumption, so the constraint that they receive a given level β
(≥ 0) of expected utility becomes
pRαR + (pS − pR)αS + (1− pS)αF = β. (20)
In equilibrium, a ﬁrm owner’s expected consumption is C + πi(r) if he takes a loan at interest rate
r and carries out his investment project (of type i) and C otherwise. So if, for instance, β equals
the sum of collateral and expected equilibrium proﬁt per ﬁrm owner, then the ﬁrm owners are as
14That is why the case in which ﬁrms’ collateral can be traded would require a separate analysis.
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well-oﬀ in the CO as in the market equilibrium. Let m ≡ (NS + NR)/M denote the “number” of
ﬁrms per household and c2s household consumption in state s. Then,⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
c2R
c2S
c2F
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
m(C − αR) + λRS+(1−λ)RRB s
m(C − αS) + λRSB s
m(C − αF )
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (21)
The level of investment per household s is bounded above by the minimum of mB and y, i.e., either
by the amount of investment opportunities or by disposable income. For the sake of brevity, we
restrict attention on the case in which My is suﬃciently large to ﬁnance all investment projects:
mB ≤ y.
The maximum attainable expected utility for ﬁrm owners is then β = C+R¯ (achieved with s = mB
and c2s = 0 for s ∈ {R,S, F}).
Definition 3: Given β ∈ [0, C+R¯], (c1, s, c2R, c2S , c2F , αR, αS , αF ) is a constrained optimum (CO)
if it maximizes (1) subject to the constraints s ≤ mB, c1 = y− s, (20), (21), and non-negativity of
each component.
Since (1) is continuous and the set of vectors which satisfy the constraints is non-empty and
compact, a CO exists. Since households are risk-averse and ﬁrm owners are risk-neutral, household
consumption is equalized across all states in which ﬁrm owners’ consumption is positive in a CO.15
For future reference, notice that period-2 household consumption is the same when all projects
succeed or only the safe projects succeed (i.e., c2R = c2S) if
αR − αS = (1− λ)RR
mB
s. (22)
Similarly, c2S = c2F if
αS − αF = λRS
mB
s. (23)
We have to distinguish three diﬀerent cases, arising dependent on the choice of investment s.
(a) For
mB
β − C
R¯
≤ s ≤ mB β
R¯
, (24)
s is suﬃciently low and the share of investment returns in total wealth is suﬃciently small so that it
is possible to equalize households’ period-2 consumption across all three states. Solving (20), (22),
15If households consume diﬀerent quantities in two states s and s′, say, their marginal rate of substitution diﬀers
from ps/ps′ , which is the ﬁrm owners’ marginal rate of substitution. So if the ﬁrm owners’ consumption is positive
in both states, there is scope for a mutually beneﬁcial reallocation of resources.
17
s

smB β
R¯
mB β
(1−λ)R¯
αR
αS
αF
mC
m
(
C + λ
1−λ
β
pS
)
c2F
c2R/S
c2R
c2S
β
β
pR


mB β
R¯
mB β
(1−λ)R¯
c2R/S/F



smB β
R¯
mB β
(1−λ)R¯
ν(s)
s∗∗
Figure 6: Consumption levels with optimal risk sharing under asymmetric information
and (23) for the αs’s and substituting into (21) gives:⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
αR
αS
αF
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
β + λRS+(1−λ)RR−R¯mB s
β + λRS−R¯mB s
β − R¯mB s
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
and
c2R/S/F = m(C − β) +
R¯
B
s (25)
(consumers’ and ﬁrm owners’ state-contingent consumption levels in this and the following two
cases are illustrated in the upper two panels of Figure 6). If the ﬁrst inequality in (24) is violated,
then the returns on investment are insuﬃcient so as to satisfy (20). When the second inequality
in (24) is violated, the non-negativity αF ≥ 0 does not hold, i.e., the ﬁrm owners’ risk bearing
capacity in the state when all projects fail is exhausted.
(b) Second, consider investment levels
mB
β
R¯
≤ s ≤ mB β
(1− λ)R¯ . (26)
In this case, it is possible to equalize consumption in states R and S, but not in F . From (20)-(22)
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and αF = 0, we obtain: ⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
αR
αS
αF
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
pS
[
β + (1−λ)pS (RR−RS)mB s
]
1
pS
[
β − (1−λ)R¯mB s
]
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
and ⎛
⎝ c2R/S
c2F
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ m
(
C − βpS
)
+ RSB s
mC
⎞
⎠ . (27)
(c) Finally, for
mB
β
(1− λ)R¯ ≤ s, (28)
c2R exceeds c2S and c2F even if R is the only state in which ﬁrm owners consume:⎛
⎝ αR
αS/F
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ βpR
0
⎞
⎠ .
and ⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
c2R
c2S
c2F
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
m
(
C − βpR
)
+ λRS+(1−λ)RRB s
mC + λRSB s
mC
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (29)
Substituting c1 = y−s and c2s from (25), (27), and (29) into (1) gives households’ expected utility as
a function ν(s) of s alone. The level of investment in a CO is s∗∗ = argmaxs ν(s) s.t.: 0 ≤ s ≤ mB.
The function ν(s) is strictly concave (see the lower panel of Figure (6)). This follows from the
fact that if two (c1, s, c2R, c2S , c2F , αR, αS , αF ) satisfy the constraints in Deﬁnition 3, then a convex
combination also satisﬁes these constraints (because of linearity of the constraints) and yields
higher expected utility (because of strict concavity of the function in (1) in (c1, c2R, c2S , c2F )). ν(s)
is continuous and it is diﬀerentiable in the interior of the intervals in (24), (26), and (28):
ν ′(s)+(y−s)−θ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
δR¯
B
[
m(C − β) + R¯B s
]−θ
; mB β−C
R¯
< s < mB β
R¯
δR¯
B
[
m
(
C − βpS
)
+ RSB s
]−θ
; mB β
R¯
< s < mB β
(1−λ)R¯
δpR[λRS+(1−λ)RR ]
B
[
m
(
C − βpR
)
+ λRS+(1−λ)RRB s
]−θ
+ δ(pS−pR)λRSB
(
mC + λRSB s
)−θ
; mB β
(1−λ)R¯ < s
.
(30)
It has kinks at mBβ/R¯ and at mBβ/[(1 − λ)R¯]. There are four possible types of solutions to
s∗∗ = argmaxs ν(s) s.t.: 0 ≤ s ≤ mB. For s′(mB) ≥ 0, all projects are realized in the CO: s∗∗ = mB.
For s′(0) ≤ 0, it is optimal not to invest at all: s∗∗ = 0. If ν ′(s∗∗) = 0 for some s∗∗ that satisﬁes one
of the inequalities on the right-hand side of (30), then it is optimal to invest s∗∗. The ﬁnal possibility
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is that ν(s) attains its maximum at one of the kinks, i.e., at s∗∗ = mBβ/R¯ or mBβ/[(1 − λ)R¯].
By virtue of the theorem of the maximum, s∗∗ is a continuous function of β and C. In a CO with
ν ′(s∗∗) = 0, investment s∗∗ increases when β rises or C falls. This follows from the strict concavity
of ν(s) and the fact that an increase in β or a decrease in C raises ν ′(s) (see (30)). Optimum
investment s∗∗ also increases with β when it occurs at a kink of ν(s).
Depending on the model parameters β, R¯, and λ, some or all of cases (a)-(c) arise for admissible
investment levels 0 ≤ s ≤ mB.
R¯ ≤ β:
In this case, s ≤ mB ≤ mBβ/R¯. From (24), only case (a) can arise. It is optimal to carry out all
projects (i.e., s∗∗ = mB) if (ν ′(mB) ≥ 0, i.e.)
β ≥ R¯+ C −
(
y
m
−B
)(
δR¯
B
) 1
θ
.
Otherwise optimum investment satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition ν ′(s∗∗) = 0, i.e.,
s∗∗ =
y −
(
δR¯
B
)− 1
θ m(C − β)
1 + δ−
1
θ
(
R¯
B
)− 1−θ
θ
. (31)
Since β ≥ R¯ and R¯ > C, we have β > C. So, as noted in the discussion of case (a) above, s∗∗ > 0.
(1− λ)R¯ ≤ β < R¯:
For s small enough, case (a) applies. For s = mB, (26) holds with strict inequalities, i.e., case (b)
applies. From (30), it is optimal to ﬁnance all projects if
β ≥ R¯+ pS
⎡
⎣C − ( y
m
−B
)(
δR¯
B
) 1
θ
⎤
⎦ .
If the right-hand side of this inequality is non-positive for C = 0, then it is optimal to realize all
projects (i.e., s∗∗ = mB) for C low enough, irrespective of β. If the right-hand side is positive for
C = 0, s∗∗ = mB becomes optimal once β is large enough. If β ≥ C, zero investment is ruled out
on the same grounds as before. If, on the other hand, β < C, s∗∗ = 0 is optimal (i.e., ν ′(0) ≤ 0) if
β ≤ C −
(
δR¯
B
) 1
θ y
m
. (32)
β < (1− λ)R¯:
Each of the cases (a)-(c) arises for some s ≤ mB. It is optimal to realize all projects if ν ′(mB) ≥ 0,
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Figure 7: Optimum investment with asymmetric information
where now the last lines on the right-hand side of (30) are relevant. As in the preceding case, s∗∗ > 0
for β ≥ C, while s∗∗ = 0 if (32) holds for β < C.
The results are summarized in Figure 7 (where s∗∗ < mB for β = 0) and in:
Proposition 6: For β = 0, s∗∗ > 0 or s∗∗ = 0, depending on whether C < (y/m)(δR¯/B)1/θ or
C ≥ (y/m)(δR¯/B)1/θ, respectively. In the latter case, s∗∗ > 0 for β > C − (y/m)(δR¯/B)1/θ. s∗∗ is
non-decreasing in β. s∗∗ = mB for β ≥ R¯+ C − (y/m−B)(δR¯/B)1/θ.
In words, consumers respond to a reduction in their period-2 consumption possibilities brought
about by an increase in the ﬁrm owners’ expected utility β with higher investment s∗∗. Increases
in collateral C relax the constraint that ﬁrm owners receive a given level of expected utility, so
optimum investment s∗∗ decreases.
Having characterized both the credit market equilibrium and the CO, we can now address the
question of whether there is too little or too much investment in equilibrium.
Proposition 7: In a PRE or a TPE, (a) for C small enough, there is under-investment relative
to the CO for all β; (b) for C large enough, there is over-investment for suﬃciently low values of
β and under-investment for suﬃciently high values of β.
Proof: (a) Suppose β = C = 0. From (28), case (c) applies for all investment levels. As noted above,
β ≥ C implies that the CO entails s∗∗ > 0. From (30), s∗∗ satisﬁes
s∗∗ =
y
1 + δ−
1
θ
{
pR
[
λRS+(1−λ)RR
B
]1−θ
+ (pS − pR)
(
λRS
B
)1−θ}− 1θ .
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The term in braces exceeds
pR
(
RS
B
)1−θ
+ (pS − pR)
(
λRS
B
)1−θ
= Rˆ(rS). (33)
So, from (4), s∗∗ > s∗(rS) for β = C = 0. C = 0 is not admissible in the equilibrium analysis (in
the absence of collateral, ﬁrms would have nothing to lose from taking a credit). But both optimum
investment s∗∗ and s∗(rS) are continuous functions of C (for s∗(rS), this follows from the deﬁnition
of rS, (3), (4), and (9)). Therefore, there is under-investment (i.e., s
∗∗ > s∗(rS)) for β = 0 and C
suﬃciently small. The fact that s∗∗ is non-decreasing in β and s∗(rS) (< mB) is independent of β
implies under-investment for all β.
(b) The fact that s∗∗ = 0 for β = 0 and C ≥ (y/m)(δR¯/B)1/θ (from Proposition 6) and s∗(rS) >
(1 − λ)mB > 0 (from (7)) implies that there is over-investment for β = 0 and C large enough.
Under-investment occurs as β becomes suﬃciently large so that s∗∗ = mB. ||
From (4), for each C (and other model parameters except y), there exists y such that (7) is
satisﬁed. So, from Proposition 1, for each C > 0 and β ≥ 0, there exist parameterizations of the
model such that a PRE or a TPE exists. This proves that parameter combinations exist such that
over-investment arises in a PRE or a TPE.
The standard under-investment result holds true if ﬁrms have little collateral and a suﬃciently
high weight in the planning solution. However, if there is abundant collateral a large portion of
which can be reallocated to the consumers in the CO, then there is equilibrium over-investment.
To illustrate this, let us return to our running example:
y M θ δ B pS pR R¯ C NS NR β
10 3,000 0.5 0.95 100 0.9 0.8 110 80 100 100 81.1737
As mentioned at the end of Section 3, there is a TPE with s∗(rS) = 4.9369 and v(rS) = 8.8883.
Total expected ﬁrm proﬁt (X1/B)(1 − λ)πR(rS) is 234.7463, so expected proﬁt per ﬁrm owner
is 1.1737. This motivates our choice of β, which equals the value of the collateral plus expected
proﬁt per capita. Optimal investment is s∗∗ = 5.0123, which is the solution to ν ′(s∗∗) = 0 in case
(b). There is under-investment: the “number” of projects ﬁnanced in the credit market equilibrium
(i.e., 3,000 · 4.9369/100 = 148.1065) falls short of the optimum “number” (i.e., 3,000 · 5.0143/100 =
150.3701). Indirect utility is (ν(s∗∗) =) 8.8962. The credit market equilibrium is doubly ineﬃcient:
there is too little investment, and too large a proportion of the investment capital is dedicated
to risky projects. Proposition 7 suggests that over-investment tends to arise when β falls. In fact,
when β = 75 (holding everything else equal), we have s∗∗ = 4.8147 < 4.9369 = s∗(rS) (maximum
utility rises to 9.0621).
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7 Conclusion
The present paper deviates from the common assumption in models of the credit market with
asymmetric information that single-name credit risks cancel out and do not create any portfolio risk.
The introduction of portfolio risk raises several interesting questions and yields several interesting
results. A credit market equilibrium with pure credit rationing becomes possible. Rationing tends
to arise when lenders become more risk-averse. Changes in the parameters of the credit market that
lead to a switch from a two-price equilibrium to pure rationing, such as the introduction of a usury
law, raise welfare. Compared to the optimal allocation of resources, the credit market equilibrium is
characterized by either under-investment or over-investment, where the latter tends to occur when
collateral is high and ﬁrm owners get little consumption. The implications of the model are thus
much richer than the standard SW model’s, in which a non-market clearing equilibrium is generally
a TPE and there is too little investment in equilibrium.
The most promising route for future research seems to be the introduction of bank capital. In the
model considered here, there are no intermediaries with positive equity that could serve as a buﬀer
against loan losses. Introducing bank capital would help make the model more complete, as one
could distinguish the portions of the banks’ credit risk borne by the bank owners (the major part
or all) and by the depositors (little or none at all), respectively. Another possible extension of the
model would introduce lenders with heterogeneous risk attitudes, which would raise the question
of the optimal allocation of risks across diﬀerently risk-averse agents. Risky collateral would shed
further light on optimal risk sharing. These, and possibly further, issues can only be meaningfully
addressed in a model with portfolio risk, and we are conﬁdent that our results will hold true with
a small amount of bank capital, a small second group of consumers with diﬀerent risk attitude, or
uncertain collateral with a small variance.
Appendix A.1: Uncorrelated payoﬀs
This appendix compares the model with non-diversiﬁable risk to the standard SW model, in which
single-name risks cancel out completely. We show that the introduction of correlation between
project payoﬀs possibly causes the emergence of credit rationing and that it tends to reduce equi-
librium investment. We also prove the standard equilibrium under-investment result for the SW
model.
Call the model with non-diversiﬁable risk described in Sections 2 and 4 model “C”. Let “U” be the
identically parameterized (SW) model that is obtained by replacing correlated with uncorrelated
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payoﬀs. In model U, the (due to Uhlig’s, 1996, law of large numbers) safe return on lending is
iˇ(r) = pr+(1− p)(C/B− 1) for r ≤ rS and iˇ(r) = pRr+(1− pR)(C/B − 1) for rS < r ≤ rR. Since
consumers do not face any risk, the expected utility and OCE approaches yield the same results
for U. Let Rˇ(r) = [1 + iˇ(r)]1−θ. Optimal saving sˇ∗(r) is given by
sˇ∗(r) =
y
1 + δ−
1
η Rˇ(r)−
1
1−θ
1−η
η
(A.1)
(cf. (17)). Let
NRB < sˇ
∗(rS)M < (NS +NR)B (A.2)
(cf. (7)).
The following proposition states that the introduction of portfolio risk possibly “causes” the emer-
gence of credit rationing:
Proposition A.1: (a) There exist parameters such that U does not have a PRE but C does. (b)
The reverse is not true.
Proof: The return function iˇ(r) attains its unique global maximum iˇ(rR) = R¯/B − 1 at rR. Given
(A.2), similar arguments as in the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2 prove that there is a TPE and not
a PRE. So U does not possess a PRE. (a) Jointly with Proposition 2, this proves the former part
of the proposition. (b) The fact that U does not possess a PRE also contradicts the supposition
that C does not have a PRE but U does. ||
Another way to compare models U and C is to ask which one brings forth higher investment. The
following proposition states that the introduction of portfolio risk reduces equilibrium investment:
Proposition A.2: Equilibrium investment is lower in C than in U.
Proof: From (9) and (10), E[i(r)] = iˇ(r) for all r ≤ rR. Using Rˇ(r) = [1 + iˇ(r)]1−θ, it follows that
Rˇ(r) = {1 + E[i(r)]}1−θ .
Jensen’s inequality implies Rˆ(r) < Rˇ(r) if θ < 1 and Rˆ(r) > Rˇ(r) if θ > 1. In either case, from
(17) and (A.1), we have s∗(r) < sˇ∗(r) (given η < 1). That is, the presence of risk reduces optimal
saving (cf. Basu and Ghosh, 1993, Proposition 1, pp. 121-2). Since (7) holds, the equilibrium of C
is a TPE or a PRE, and equilibrium investment is S(rS ,M) = s
∗(rS)M . Since (A.2) holds, the
equilibrium of U is a TPE, and equilibrium investment is sˇ∗(rS)M . The validity of the assertion
follows from s∗(r) < sˇ∗(r). ||
De Meza and Webb (1987, Proposition 5A, pp. 287-8) argue that the equilibrium of the SW model
is characterized by under-investment (irrespective of whether the credit market clears or not). They
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assume that, in the optimum, the proceeds of the investment projects accrue to the consumers,
but the collateral remains with the ﬁrm owners, i.e., using the notation of Section 6, β = C.
Since diversiﬁcation eliminates project-speciﬁc risks, safe and risky projects are equally good under
these assumptions, whether there is asymmetric information or not does not matter, the ﬁrst-best
and second-best optima coincide. The following proposition generalizes the De Meza-Webb (1987)
result:
Proposition A.3: In an equilibrium of U with s∗(r) < mB and r < rR, there is under-investment
for β ≥ C.
Proof: Consider the optimal solution for model U. Given independent project risks, the safe rate of
return is R¯/B−1. Since consumers do not face any risk, we can use the notation of the model with
expected utility (i.e., η = θ). Period-2 consumption c2 is then given by the right-hand side of (25).
If optimum investment is mB, the condition s∗(r) < mB of the proposition implies that there is
under-investment. So we can focus on an interior optimum. Optimum investment sˇ∗∗ is then given
by the right-hand side of (31), so
sˇ∗∗ ≥ y
1 + δ−
1
θ
(
R¯
B
)− 1−θ
θ
(A.3)
for β ≥ C. In an equilibrium of U, as shown in the proof of Proposition A.1, we have iˇ(r) < R¯/B−1
for r < rR. Hence, Rˇ(r) < (R¯/B)
1−θ. From (A.1) with η = θ and (A.3), sˇ∗∗ > sˇ∗(r). ||
If s∗(r) = mB in equilibrium, under-investment evidently cannot arise. Optimum investment is
then also equal to mB. The condition r < rR rules out the special case in which the supply of
funds at the projects’ expected rate of return R¯/B − 1 is merely suﬃcient to ﬁnance NR projects.
Equilibrium and optimum again coincide in this case.
Appendix A.2: First-best optimum
This appendix analyzes the ﬁrst-best optimum that can be achieved when, contrary to what has
been assumed in Section 6, it is possible to distinguish safe and risky projects.
Clearly, for Ms ≤ NSB, the ﬁrst-best solution entails that only safe projects are realized. For
Ms > NSB, all NS safe projects as well as Ms/B −NS risky projects are realized. So⎛
⎝ c2R/S
c2F
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ m(C − γS) + RSB s
m(C − γF )
⎞
⎠ ,
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Figure A.1: Consumption levels with optimal risk sharing under symmetric information
for s ≤ mBλ and ⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
c2R
c2S
c2F
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
m(C − δR)− λm(RR −RS) + RRB s
m(C − δS) + λmRS
m(C − δF )
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
for mBλ < s, where the γ’s and δ’s are the ﬁrm owners’ consumption levels in the respective cases
and states of nature. The constraint that they receive expected utility β reads:
pSγS + (1− pS)γF = β
for s ≤ mBλ and
pRδR + (pS − pR)δS + (1− pS)δF = β
for mBλ < s. For the sake of brevity, we conﬁne attention to cases where β is not too large:16
β < λR¯. (A.4)
Similarly as in the preceding section, we obtain four diﬀerent cases:
(a) First, let
mB
β − C
R¯
≤ s ≤ mB β
R¯
.
The second inequality and (A.4) jointly imply s ≤ mBλ. c2 is equalized across all states:⎛
⎝ γS
γF
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ β + 1m RS−R¯B s
β − 1m R¯B s
⎞
⎠ ,
16This condition is inessential for the determination of optimum investment (cf. footnote 17 below).
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and c2s is given by (25).
(b) For
mB
β
R¯
< s ≤ mBλ, (A.5)
still only safe projects are realized, but the non-negativity constraint on γ is binding:
⎛
⎝ γS
γF
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ βpS
0
⎞
⎠ ,
and c2s is given by (27).
(c) For
mBλ < s ≤ mBβ + λR¯
R¯
,
some risky projects are carried out:
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
δR
δS
δF
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
β
pS
− λ(RR −RS) + 1m RR−RSB s
1
pS
(
β + λR¯− 1m R¯B s
)
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
and (27) gives period-2 consumption.
(d) For
mB
β + λR¯
R¯
< s,
ﬁrm owners consume only in the state when the risky projects succeed:
⎛
⎝ δR
δS/F
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ βpR
0
⎞
⎠ .
Household consumption is given by
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
c2R
c2S
c2F
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
m
(
C − βpR
)
− λm(RR −RS) + RRB s
mC + λmRS
mC
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
Consider the expected utility setup. Substituting the state-contingent consumption levels c2s into
(1) yields expected utility as a function of investment s alone.17 This allows us to conduct the welfare
analysis parallel to the second-best case. One noteworthy implication is that the state-contingent
consumption levels c2s (s ∈ {R,S, F}) are identical in the second-best and ﬁrst-best solutions for
17The reason why condition (A.4) is inessential is that the same function ν(s) also gives utility if the inequality
sign in (A.4) is reversed.
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investment levels s up to the minimum of mBβ/[(1− λ)R¯] and mB(β + λR¯)/R¯. So if the second-
best and ﬁrst-best investment levels are small enough, the second-best and ﬁrst-best household
consumption and utility levels coincide. This is because the fact that the projects are more risky
on average in the second-best solution does not matter for consumer welfare as long as the ﬁrm
owners’ risk bearing capacity is suﬃcient so as to absorb the additional risk. A simple suﬃcient
condition is that β ≥ (1−λ)R¯, for in this case, s ≤ mB ≤ min{mBβ/[(1−λ)R¯], mB(β+λR¯)/R¯}.
For the sake of brevity, we merely prove that there is equilibrium under-investment for low levels of
collateral and ﬁrm owner expected utility and illustrate the possibility of over-investment by means
of the running example.
Proposition A.4: In a PRE or TPE, for C and β small enough and s∗(rS) < mBλ, there is
under-investment.
Proof: Let s˜∗∗ denote optimum investment. We can focus on the case s˜∗∗ < mBλ, since otherwise
the assertion of the proposition trivially holds true. Given β = 0, case (b) applies (cf. (A.5)). Using
(27) and β = C = 0, we obtain optimal investment:
s˜∗∗ =
y
1 + δ−
1
θ p
− 1
θ
S
(
RS
B
)− 1−θ
θ
.
From (4) and (33), it follows that s˜∗∗ > s∗(rS). C = 0 is not admissible in the equilibrium analysis.
But both optimum investment s∗∗ and s∗(rS) are continuous functions of β and C (this follows
from the theorem of the maximum for s˜∗∗ and from the deﬁnition of rS , (3), (4), and (9) for s∗(rS)).
So s˜∗∗ > s∗(rS) holds true for β and C suﬃciently close to zero. ||
To illustrate the fact that the second-best solution does not necessarily imply a welfare loss com-
pared to the ﬁrst-best optimum and the possibility of over-investment relative to the ﬁrst-best
outcome, we return to the example at the end of Section 6, except that we now set β = 50, so that
(A.4) is satisﬁed. The CO displays over-investment: s∗∗ = 4.0145 < 4.9369 = s∗(rS). Indirect utility
ν(s∗∗) = 9.7036 exceeds the equilibrium value by 9.17%. The ﬁrst-best optimum is characterized
by the same amount of investment (and, therefore, over-investment) and the same level of indirect
utility. This is because s∗∗ = 4.0145 < 6.06 = min{mBβ/[(1 − λ)R¯], mB(β + λR¯)/R¯}.
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